Journal
10/12/03
Mike Steely
Report on article: "China toys with de-Jiangification," by Willy Lo-Lap Lam, CNN Senior China Analyst
The measures taken by Deng and his regime after the demise of Mao were drastic. Though the major reform was economic and devoid of any real politicized reform, complete power remained in the hands of China's rulers. The effects of Deng's reforms, as they spun the country out of control, were massive, though not in the way that the effects Mao's had had as we have seen. The effect, as it were, was that resulting calamities had each successor trying to make up for his predecessor's mistakes. And it is no different for the current regime. As Lam states in his article, "To a large extent, the success of the new administration of President Hu Jintao and Premier Wen Jiabao will be measured by how much it is able to rectify the shortfalls and excesses of the era of former President Jiang Zemin."
As the newly-appointed president, Hu has begun a move towards what Lam coins "de-Jiangification." This move is expected to occur at the Third Plenary Session of the Communist Party Central Committee this month: The Third Plenum will begin with the Politburo presenting a report to the Central Committee. In effect, what this means is that the Politburo is showing that it is accountable to the 198 Central Committee members.
According to Lam, this is none other than a "breakthrough" for dangnei minzhu or "intra-party democracy," since it was Jiang, who, as party chief from 1989 to 2002, had stifled the Central Committee and the Politburo of any control. In the era of Jiang, the power rested mainly in his hands or at times along with the five-member Politburo Standing Committee. Lam also reports that "Hu was keen to establish some degree of checks and balances among party organs such as the Politburo, the Central Committee, the Party Congress (which elects the Central Committee every five years), and the party's anti-graft watchdog, the Central Commission for Disciplinary Inspection (CCDI)."
In addition, in another reversal of Jiang's past authority, Hu may also try to implement an "element of election and competition" in the process of appointing senior cadres at provincial, municipal and county levels.
Lam also reports that in dealing with the major problem of corruption, "Hu's leadership has taken a new approach to eliminating graft: nurturing viable institutions and conventions." This was in response to the Jiang attitude toward the scandals of the late 1990s. Hu's new measure attempts to abolish what has become known as "the exchange of power for money," by veering from the old approach of " inculcating [the proper] ideology and work style," and replacing it with new procedures for a "clean government." In implementing this, Hu has sent a team of "imperial inspectors" to the provinces of Guizhou, Hunan, Jilin, Jiangsu and Gansu since early summer to inspect the integrity of officials and state entrepreneurs.
This new approach has, of course, recently clashed with the controversy regarding the case of Zhou Zhengyi, the Shanghai real-estate speculator, whose case made headlines for his alleged corruption. While Jiang, who has the most clout in Shanghai politics, intervened on Zhou's behalf by noting that the scandal should be "tackled with the proper perspective," it is Hu and Wu whose timely initiative in building clean government and closing loopholes demonstrated to most cadres which forces were putting up resistance to reform. This sounds reminiscent of earlier events in China, such as Mao's anti-rightist ploy, only now it appears that the glove may be on the other hand. Lam's report ends on a less than optimistic note, however: Analysts have warned not to be overly optimistic that "Hu's de-Jiangification gambit would necessarily lead to Western-style liberalization." As we have seen in Becker's The Chinese, any reforms must serve the Party and Chinese socialism.
